History in the State of Emergency: Time and Space as Counter-Concepts to the End of History and the Clash of Civilizations

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“The revolutions of mankind create new time-spans for our life on earth. They give man’s soul a new relation between present, past and future; and by doing so they give us time to start our life on earth all over again, with a new rhythm and a new faith. For ordering the three dimensions of time, we need what St. Ambrose called the times of times, temporum tempora, standards for making the right distribution between past, future and present. [...] Modern men talk so much about the three dimensions of space that they are ignorant of the fact itself that space has nothing of the tremendous triplicity of dimensions which time contains”

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I. Introduction

Time and Space are the most important categories for historians. Most of us are used to analyze history for concrete or real entities like nations, states, or tribes for a period of time. Certainly, there may be a small number of historians who rarely ask about the periods and spaces they work about, because both—time and space—seem somehow real and quasi-naturally given. Even though I would like to avoid the construction of a puppet, we cannot deny that some of us who might know about invention of history, imagined communities and the social construction of space do research without reflecting their concepts of time and space. Additionally, sometimes it seems that reflecting on the construction of entities and categories is outshined by the composition and selection of sources.

Perhaps there is a set of reasons for avoiding theories: At first, some theories are too general for catching the complexity of history; secondly, vice versa, some theories are too complex for telling a good story; thirdly—last not least—there might be a historian’s immodesty to be administrators of historical meaning for a community. The problem is that some historians construct an implicit link between meaning and space. In this case space transforms into a time-container with a distinct eschatology defining the boundaries of a community. In my eyes, meaning is too exclusive because it divides the world in normative pieces hidden behind a historical pseudo-objectivity. Even I do not believe that historians can escape from the trap of observing history without being embedded in socially determined patterns of rationality. It is our task to reflect this problem without devaluing the other. Therefore, it seems to me that

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we should contribute to provide orientation in time and space as a tool for historical reflection and comparison instead of teaching that future needs a past. History is not a cumulative learning-process on a timeline because expectations change experiences. Thus, meaning is no category we should mix with historical research and teaching—especially that kind of history was and is senseless that solely orientated on the historical construction of the meaning of one exclusive entity (for ex. nationalistic historiographies).

In a nutshell: meaning is no category historians should use, but orientation is—and orientation means to deal with the different perspectives historical actors and observers usually have. Therefore, we need both—theory and methodology—to do historical research, because otherwise we are just creating a patchwork of sources and a one-sided history. And the starting point of any reflection must be the where and when—the spatial and temporal construction of in- and outside in history.

The reflection of history and historiography looks back to a long history. Since the Age of Enlightenment scholars have been trying—and sometimes to hide—yardsticks for providing a meaningful or factual history. This history of historiography easily tempts historians to think that we already know about finding reliable sources, concepts, and methods. Like most people, we historians tend to see ourselves at the edge of theoretical and methodological progress. But, are we? What is the difference between the historian’s self-confidence in the 19th and the 21st century?

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The truth is that there is none, because each generation experiencing a crisis *rewrites* history from a different perspective, even if some concepts may last. This is for ex. evident for the division of the past in chronological periods like ancient, medieval, and modern history, because any invention of an *Ancien Régime* is just another way to mark a break between the dark past and a bright future in an *Age of Revolutions*. Thus, history is always a construction, and we should reflect what the hidden agenda of creating chronologies and maps–time and space–is.

This paper deals with the story behind the story told by the spatial and chronological categories Samuel P. Huntington and Francis Fukuyama used to construct *homogeneity* and *heterogeneity* on global scale, for example. Additionally, I would like to illustrate that history is an institution that mediates contingency concerning the borders of a society. A society in crisis lacks institutions which mediate contingency, or its institutions are losing the ability of reducing contingency. In both cases people lose their orientation regarding what *makes sense*. In addition to this, the elites–more generally spoken the *actors*–lose their legitimacy, and in the most extreme cases of civil war or revolution a situation occurs when that is happening what Hobbes feared most:

“Profecto utrumque verè dictum est, Homo homini deus, & Homo homini lupus. Illud si conciues inter se; Hoc, si ciuitates comparemus.”

It is the *state of emergency* (Schmitt) when spatial and chronological concepts change. In such a *charismatic situation* (Weber) history must be

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8 Hobbes: 1983, 73.
rewritten (Rosenstock-Huessy) because the old order and concepts have lost their ability to generate orientation in time and space.\(^9\) Needless to say that this rewriting has to include new actors and perspectives such as history from below or gender history, promoting another extension of equality in history, as it happened by the revolution of 1968. Anyway, it is not necessarily the case that all traditional concepts are disposed because some of them might be updated. This is one of the objects of investigation of conceptual history.

Conceptual history is based on the assumption that modern social and political concepts have been produced by the permanent global crisis since the French Revolution.\(^10\) When we speak of modernity, we still believe that we are involved in this process; yet speaking about post-modernity means that we believe to see through this process of discursive construction of reality. Unfortunately, this distinction is just right to a certain degree. We are re- and deconstructing the history of concepts, but in doing so we create new meanings and concepts too. We are observing history, but we are also involved in it. We are living in a World Society provided by modern communication that creates a global space of observation and comparability, but this world is not one.\(^11\) In brief: history changes, and so does historiography, because we historians are involved observers, and even if we try to tell history as a non-centric, non-nationalistic, non-modern, or non-postmodern way of generating a whole, we are still creating new dimensions of in- and outside and cut the globe into new chronological and spatial pieces. As long we are still able to find counter-concepts to those concepts

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\(^10\) Koselleck: 1972, XVf.

that provide social and political orientation, we are not living in a *harmoniversum*
but in one world−whatever we call it−in which different perspectives and *polities*
still persist.\(^\text{12}\)

This paradox situation derives from the contradiction between those
institutions which were empowered by the French Revolution: nation and
sovereignty vs. cosmopolitanism and universalism, freedom vs. equality, and
solidarity vs. individualism. In this *field of tensions* historians started to
reconstruct a new secular definition of time, promising revolutionary change or
hoping for the comeback of a better, long-lasting rationality of a historical path.

At the end of the 20th century in Fukuyama’s eyes the contradiction
seemed to have come to an end, whereas Huntington believed in a comeback of
conflicts between civilizations in a new disguise. While Fukuyama stressed the
role of revolutions and time for history, it was Huntington who spatially
reconstructed a long lasting dichotomy between civilizations. This paper is not
about their concepts of civilization\(^\text{13}\) but about the ways in which they
constructed space and time to contribute to historical orientation. Even if I will
discuss some of their arguments briefly, it is not the goal of this paper to
completely resume the state of research and debate concerning *Clash of
Civilizations* vs. *End of History* −this would be another task.\(^\text{14}\) Anyway, it seems

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\(^\text{13}\) Brett Bowden’s study in the evolution of “The Empire of Civilization” provides a lot of insights
regarding this point: Bowden: 2009 (see especially pp. 3f, 226.)
\(^\text{14}\) Nevertheless, it seems useful to introduce briefly some works I will refer to: Niethammer (1989)
pleas for a micro−instead of macro-historical view but he provides deep insights in the different
topoi of posthistoire−the different philosophical interpretation of the crisis and history of
modernity connected with a vision of an “End of History”. Meyer (1993) and Anderson (1993) are
good discussions and introductions of Fukuyama and posthistoire-thinking. Pöggeler’s lecture
(1995) is less convincing. Rohbeck (2003) tries to bridge theoretically between different
useful to kick off with a reflection on what the debate itself indicates, because the guiding question of this paper is whether space and time might be counter-concepts in a struggle for providing historical orientation.

II.1 Time and Space as concepts of polity

Changes in the construction and imagination of time and space are good indicators for the relationship between history and historiography in critical times. Imaginaries are mapping space and time. In a crisis the institutions–informal values and formal norms–lose their ability to reduce contingency and people lose their orientation. Because imaginaries are the set of institutions–the polity\textsuperscript{15}–which mark a society and define their chronological and spatial borders, a crisis might raise questions concerning future, past, and space of a society.

Furthermore—as already pointed out–there is a reciprocal relationship between actors and institutions. In the case of political actors it is their legitimacy that derives from the orientation given by institutions (laws, values, imaginations of history including the Posthistoire. Sanmartin's contribution (2004) includes a brief discussion of the debate about Fukuyama and some ideas concerning the future of historiography. The articles in Pesch's volume (1997) discuss more the future of IR instead of Fukuyama's and Huntington's theories. Fabeck's book (1997) provides some interesting insights in the dialectic of freedom and totalitarianism. Tibi (2002) and Kagan (2009) rethink Huntington's concept from different points of view: Whereas Tibi is interested in the relationship between religion and politics; it is Kagan who discusses the current rise of a political pluriversum and the return of nationalism. Kagan's arguments sound like an adaptation of Huntington's prediction of the decline of USA based on 'classical' political parameters. Çağlar attacks Huntington and his imagination of modernity as a kind of Western fundamentalism. Regarding parallels between Rosenstock-Huessy's and Fukuyama's concepts of the End of History: Van der Pijl: 1996; Leutzsch: 2009, 142-178, 292-306.

\textsuperscript{15} I use this term following John Meyer's new-institutionalism. What I aim is to combine his theory of institutional change, isomorphism, and agency with the reflection of history. Additionally, I am following his idea that equality is one of the most important institutions. Good introductions are: Meyer: 2009 and Meyer/Boli/Ramirez: 1997.
habits, and norms) they themselves empower. To give an example: in the Age of Equality a political actor who wants the people to live modestly should live under quite similar circumstances. This was, for instance, not the case in France in 1789, St. Petersburg in 1917, Berlin in 1989, and Tripoli in 2011 and, therefore, people lost their trust in the institutions providing legitimacy for the political actors. Indeed, these are typical modern examples because since the French Revolution the imagination of equity as equality has been and still is the most important institution.

Besides, at this time the imagination of time and space changed dramatically, because history and progress were linked with each other and created that field of tensions I have mentioned above. The secularization of God’s will changed God’s unforeseeable history into a manmade and directed one. History became interpretable as a meaningful timeline between past and future. This homogenization of time enabled historians and social scientists to observe progressiveness and backwardness of cultures, states, and other entities based on a global comparison of time-containers. Concepts of time such as revolution or progress became institutions themselves. The decapitation of God followed the decapitation of kings.

Until 1789 polity was marked by what Kantorowicz called the King’s two bodies and Bloch discussed as the King’s thaumaturgy, but the signature of modern age seemed to be what Schmitt or Voegelin analyzed as political

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16 See footnote 15.
theologies.\footnote{Kantorowicz: 1997; Bloch: 1998; Schmitt: 2009b; Voegelin: 2007.} To make a long story short: in the first half of the 20th century the reflection of the institutional relationship between politics and religion—marking the nomos of society and encompassing hierarchy, legitimacy, and eschatology—was part of historical diagnosis.

Perhaps it makes sense to speak of two organizations—the Church and the government—which created that (European) kind of polity Hobbes called the Leviathan: a space with a clear definition of who belongs to the nation (inside) and who does not (outside), based on a specific local representation of God’s eternity, with the king as the converter of his will. While the sovereign state as a product of the Reformation and civil war in Europe changed the European and world map, it was another crisis—the Age of Enlightenment—which changed the state into a national one on basis of the (re-)construction, secularization, and democratization of time and space by help of a new academic discipline—historiography. In the first half of the 20th century this new discipline like the nations was in a deep (global) crisis again and it is striking that at the end of the century the same questions were asked anew.

To sum it up: space and time are social constructions based on imaginaries and marked by a specific reciprocal relationship between actor and institutions. Thus, the legitimacy of leadership has spatial and temporal roots defining the in- and outside of society. History is—therefore—part of the polity; it is a cultural institution that provides orientation in time and space. In doing so, history creates the in- and outside of society, but it also contributes to the construction and legitimacy of relationships between man/women, top/down, old/young,
rich/poor, friend/enemy, and so on. These relationships may cause conflicts between sexes, values of status, generations, classes, parties or states in critical times. In this case the field of tensions becomes a battlefield, and the space- and time-concepts are weapons used by actors to empower new institutions in the state of emergency.

Historiography has never remained untouched by these conflicts. Historians have changed and still change their interpretations because new actors started to make and needed history for creating a new futures’ past and legitimacy. Thus, strictly spoken historiography is no science; and it does not develop in scientific revolutions–but it is strongly linked with political ones. Therefore, we have to reflect on what kind of political assumptions is hidden behind the concepts we use for constructing history–otherwise we do behave like the academics in Lagado. This is, of course, a fictional city; nevertheless it has its own history as an author’s story, and this might be true for history as well: Is it not that history is just another way of catching one’s reflection–as Swift tried by inventing the nation Balnibarbi in Gulliver’s Travels?

II.2 Folding the Arrow of Time–a reference to Carl Schmitt and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

Hence, I would like try to demonstrate that it is important to take a look behind the curtains of historical constructions–otherwise we are just playing academic games like in Lagado. Thus, the guiding question is: How and why do Fukuyama and Huntington use time to construct a social space? The goal of this

22 Koselleck: 2000, 97-118.
discussion is to look for a flexible position of observation that enables us to open our mind for a dialog between different perspectives on history without pretending to cope with objectivity.

Therefore, the quest for historical orientation has to start with the reflection of the relationship between past and future, because it is on the basis of the futures’ past that historians construct timelines as causations between selected events (e.g. revolutions) or as statistical trends (Longue durée). Foucault demonstrated that in both cases historians construct a serial history in which the future recovers damages of the past.²³

Additionally, this timeline is linked with a space-axis as a kind of coordination system based on political and social in- and exclusion processes. Since the French Revolution these processes have been folding the arrow of time. To sum it up: the future constructs our past and our space.

²³ Foucault: 2006, 23.
At first sight this seems to be a complicated relationship. Perhaps it is easier to understand that our expectations–hopes and fears–need the glance of past to gain legitimacy.24 This was the reason for the construction of a dark past after recuperation, renovation, reconquista, reformation, revolution etc.–that is what the prefix "re-" means, as Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy pointed out in his theory of revolutions. In his theory he stressed the role of rewriting history in periods of crisis.25

Another scholar who reflected the relationship between time and space as well as the spatial and chronological modes of reflection was Carl Schmitt–the famous political analyst and "Crown jurist" of the Third Reich. In one of his

articles about Donoso Cortés he differentiated between making diagnosis, developing prognosis, and drawing historical parallels. In his eyes, the pretension of objectivity is just another strategy in the political or academic discourse marked by concepts and counter-concepts. I guess it is quite evident that this kind of thinking inspired Reinhart Koselleck, whose understanding of the futures’ past I share in many ways. However, I guess that also Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s theory offers a good option to reflect on the relationship between time and spaces.

Rosenstock-Huessy—who was a friend of Carl Schmitt before the latter joined the Nazi-party—in his books on the European Revolutions demonstrated that every revolution creates a new perception of time, history, and space. Whereas Schmitt stressed the role of space for institutions and law, it was Rosenstock-Huessy who underlined the role of time for history, festive days, and the perception of revolutionary change as well as of acceleration for creating social spaces—especially the ambivalent rise of nations and World Society in the modern age. From his plea for a temporum tempora, as I quoted above, he developed a theory he called Metanomics and by which he tried to conceptualize the relationship between past and future, in- and outside, transcendence and immanence.

Besides, it is the figure of the pirate—a topos for somebody who challenges order—that marks a gap between both concepts concerning space and time: To both, Schmitt and Rosenstock-Huessy, the pirate is the one who tests, tries out

26 Schmitt: 2009a, 80-114.
and risks something. They argue on the basis of the pirate's status of not being subject to international law and space. Instead, he can trust in the freedom of the sea which is not subject to political unification and maintains this freedom within the chaos of divergent political orders. The pirate does not know boundaries—he sails on them. Therefore, in Schmitt's eyes the pirate challenges international law.\textsuperscript{28} But in the case of Rosenstock-Huessy one of those boundaries is that between transcendence and immanency—thus one has to ward off pure immanency (cold rationality) or pure transcendence (fanaticism). Only the reestablishment of a new being-in-between\textsuperscript{29} enables the pirate to bridge different cultures. This position of observation, which always has to be fought for, implies thinking about the boundary between space and time on itself.

If one considers this approach further, one can develop a concept of culture that is not bound to space. Culture therefore is defined by the way of representation of the relationship between world and heaven–immanency and transcendence—that the human develops by dialoging with and closing off from other cultures as part of their patterns of rationality. Culture only becomes a fault-line by the execution of dialogue. This means that dialogue requires the acceptance of difference and plurality to include the other instead of forcing him to assimilate. Nevertheless, in practice this kind of global dialogue produces


\textsuperscript{29} Rosenstock-Huessy's metanomic is—in my eyes—not so far away from Voegelin's metaxy as a reflection in-between 'world and heaven': Voegelin: 1989, 72ff. In both cases William James seems to be an important reference. Therefore, I guess that 'beeing-in-between' fits quite well to Rosenstock-Huessy's idea of the pirate. Regarding Voegelin and Rosenstock-Huessy see: Cristaudo: 1999.
hybrid variations of the global dominant polity locally and horizons of comparability, demonstrating the heterogeneity in the world through providing a communicative space. Global comparison may lead to confrontation but also to cooperation. In all cases boundaries are not constitutional or strictly spatial, but they are constructed against the backdrop of world views.\(^{30}\) It is the challenge of science to question this production of orders. Thus, science has to be piracy beyond space–its position is on the frontier.

Another point Rosenstock-Huessy does not share with Schmitt is that he stresses the role of nuclear weapons for forcing mankind to dialogue and establishing global horizons of comparability at the end of history.\(^{31}\) Rosenstock-Huessy believes that the possibility of total destruction prevents global communication and political dialogue between political blocs and cultures. Even this does not mean a world without war–without having the ability to make a distinction between game and gravity\(^{32}\)–it teaches us to change and being changed by other cultures. Thus, Rosenstock-Huessy refers implicitly to Schmitt’s enemy-friend dichotomy when he points out that *hostis* can mean foe and guest–depending on the fact whether he crosses the frontier with weapons or not.

To sum it up, their understanding of history differs because Schmitt preferred to think about the (spatial) roots of structures and order, whereas Rosenstock-Huessy stressed the (chronological) changes in spatial order. Despite all differences, Rosenstock-Huessy and Carl Schmitt shared the insight that in the mid-20\(^{th}\) century revolutionary change in spatial and chronological respect

\(^{30}\) Leutzsch: 2010.


\(^{32}\) Rosenstock-Huessy: 1965, 16-18.
happened globally. Perhaps this change was frozen during the Cold War, but after 1989 some questions were asked anew.

Thus, this paper deals with the rewriting of history as a result of the revolution of 1989. As a source I have chosen works by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington, and this is for two reasons: Firstly, they both reflect on the global change linked with the revolution of 1989. Secondly, these authors are well-known; therefore the reader has the ability to test my arguments through rereading their books and articles. Thirdly, they have in common that their universal historical thinking does not represent the mainstream of academic historiography—nevertheless they had a strong influence on public and academic historical thinking, and it is just narrow-minded to denounce their works as being non-academic. Last but not least, this selection offers the opportunity to discuss two extreme views on history: the social construction of space and the spatial construction of civilization.

Hence, I will discuss why these authors prefer to use chronological or spatial constructions to conceptualize their histories, because space and time might be counter-concepts in a political discourse. In this context I will much refer to Carl Schmitt’s and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy’s theories, because their conceptual history is rooted in their construction of both space and time, and in many ways it converges with Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s models. Finally, as a result of the analysis I will conclude some perspectives for global history.

III. 1 Revisiting the End of History
Fukuyama belongs to the tradition of Theories of Modernisation and Posthistoire. On the one hand Fukuyama optimistically thinks that history ends in a postmodern world in which all people are equal in a liberal sense, but on the other hand he is afraid of the ennui and decadence of a society marked by individuality instead of collective cultural challenges and beliefs. Indeed, this could be a society without meaning and dialogue— a society without metaphors for paradise and for hell—a World State in Huxley's sense.

This question of individualism and materialism is not new at all. One of the most important authors Fukuyama referred to was Alexandre Kojève, and it is telling that he discussed his concept of interpreting Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind as a prophecy of an End of history with Schmitt. Because of his involvement in the Third Reich, Carl Schmitt, who was the mastermind of space-focused conceptual history, took a back seat within the German and European academic environment after 1945. In this time, however, he came into contact with Alexandre Kojève, who was amongst the most important thinkers of Posthistoire in France. This was somehow a private preview of the struggle between the space- and heterogeneity-accentuating position of Huntington and the homogeneity- and time-stressing position of Fukuyama.

During the war, Kojève inspired a whole generation of intellectuals by his Hegel-lectures. He developed his interpretation of Hegel's phenomenology into a concept of a World State, which should be the outcome and the end of a

dialectic history based on the conflict between master and servant. History thus became an all-embracing process of the implementation of a universal norm of equality including the promise of the End of history within a universal society. The slave became the master of nature, because he prevailed against his master by adopting new knowledge and skills in his quest for recognition. Even the imaginations of the universal World State of feasibility can differ—from Stalinism to liberal democracy—but in both cases the dialectic of history and the acceleration of progress lead to the annihilation of those differences which—for Schmitt—are at the heart of the distinct character of politics and law. In Schmitt’s eyes a World State would mean the forced integration and annihilation of all differences.

Thus, it is not surprising that the liaison between Schmitt and Kojève did not last, though it opened Schmitt’s theoretical work to French post-historical thinking. Kojève’s time concept can be seen as the cynical-optimistic opponent to the sarcastic-pessimistic space concept of Schmitt. It became a kind of guideline to Francis Fukuyama’s swan song to communism, who developed his theory of inevitable victory of liberalism shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall and who understood the end of the socialistic option from a universalistic historical view.

The starting point for Fukuyama’s analysis is our pessimism, or to put it blunt: our moods. He blames this sense of crisis on the history of the 20th century and its reception:

"The pessimism of the present with regard to the possibility of progress in history was born out of two separate but parallel crises: the crisis of twentieth-
century politics, and the intellectual crisis of Western rationalism. The former killed tens of millions of people and forced hundreds of millions to live under new and more brutal forms of slavery; the latter left liberal democracy without the intellectual resources with which to defend itself. The two were interrelated and cannot be understood separately from one another.”

Fukuyama recognizes the twofold materiality of the crisis: First the crisis of Realpolitik and second the crisis of its perception and observation. He not only understands both processes as being interlinked on the level of observation but assumes an interdependent relationship. This relationship is crucial for the development of his theory, because he stresses the dependency of anthropology on the course of history. From this it follows that the perception of history influences its formation. Man learns to avoid war by accepting the need for reciprocal recognition. History and historiography become two sides of one process.

Based on an analysis of the worldwide increase of liberal democracies between 1790 and 1990 Fukuyama illustrates that ideological pessimism is baseless. On the contrary, liberal democracy has shown its assertive power against alternative forms of government. This historical progress is documented by a statistic—a classical serial history—that illustrates a fundamental change in governance between 1790 and 1990. It links the decline of totalitarian states due to a lack of legitimacy:

"The critical weakness that eventually toppled these strong states was in the last analysis a failure of legitimacy—that is a crisis on the level of ideas. Legitimacy is not justice or right in an absolute sense, it is a relative concept that exists in people’s subjective perceptions. There is no such thing as a dictator who rules purely ‘by force’, as is commonly said, for instance of Hitler. A tyrant can rule his children, old men, or perhaps his wife by force, if he is physically stronger than they are, but he is not likely to be able to rule more than two or three people in this fashion and certainly not a nation of millions.”

Here, Fukuyama points to the need of explanation of the legitimacy of dictatorial regimes, which cannot solely be based on the physical execution of power. It is rather a question of the subjective perception of those to be controlled what is a legitimate form of government. Crises of government are therefore always crises of legitimacy, whose causes cannot be reduced to problems in just one sub-system, such as economy. The perception of the general system is important as well.

Fukuyama shares this idea of a total revolution with Rosenstock-Huessy who understood the history of revolutions as a world-historical dialectic of crises of legitimacy in which the most backward part of the world makes the next revolution and creates a new model for modernity—a new center of the world. Another parallel to Rosenstock-Huessy is the submission to the dictate of a discourse that not only implies approval from the outside but also generates

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inward acceptance: "Even non-democrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard."\(^{41}\)

Furthermore, Fukuyama and Rosenstock-Huessy have a similar understanding of universal history which they do not see as an encyclopaedic summary of all events but rather as a theory-based interpretation of the direction of history, which converges with a secular \textit{eschatology} in Fukuyama’s case and in the case of Rosenstock-Huessy with the construction of an overall process—the \textit{circumvolution}—including all revolutions and enabling us to reflect on history after its end.\(^{42}\) Fukuyama’s presentations on Hegel, which were selective in the discussion of the latter’s theory in order to serve the former’s theoretical intentions and oriented towards Kojève’s interpretation, form the foundation of Fukuyama’s concept of a universal history of total time.\(^{43}\) Thereby, he explicitly separates his idea from pessimists on progress, like Spengler and Toynbee, by reactivating modernization theory in the sense of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, which was said to experience a crisis because of our pessimism.\(^{44}\) Naturally, this argument contains a positive interpretation of the history of development and modernization and misjudges not only the theoretical weaknesses of modernization theory. The most controversial consequence of his reactivation of modernization theory is his intentional \textit{Eurocentrism} that derives from a problem of comparison between advancement and backwardness and which anyway arises from his idea of a directed history.

\(^{41}\) Fukuyama: 2002, 45.
\(^{42}\) Fukuyama: 2002, 55ff. Of course there are more parallels—for ex. nearly similar titles of chapters— but Fukuyama does not quote or refer to ERH. Leutzsch: 2009, 142-178.
\(^{43}\) Fukuyama: 2002, 144.
\(^{44}\) Fukuyama: 2002, 68ff.
"But if history is never to repeat itself, there must be a constant and uniform Mechanism or set of historical first causes that dictates evolution in a single direction, and that somehow preserves that memory of earlier periods into the present. Cyclical or random views of history do not exclude the possibility of social change and limited regularities in development, but they do not require a single source of historical causation. They must also encompass a process of degeneration as well, by which consciousness of earlier achievements is completely wiped out. For without the possibility of total historical forgetting, each successive cycle would build, if only in small ways, on the experiences of earlier ones.”

This is, at least in my opinion, the strongest indicator for Fukuyama’s construction of a serial history as a more or less cumulative progress in which breaks are just temporal realizations of losses but finally lead to the End of history. By his reference to the progress of natural sciences Fukuyama demonstrates the impossibility of a setback, since the economic homogenization is linked to the development of know-how in natural science. Basically, Fukuyama describes the ratio-economic aggregate of power that came into existence by the expectations and experiences of people.

Paradoxically, he is at the same time right and wrong in his statement that an end to cumulative progress—defined as an historic oblivion concerning the achievements in natural sciences—means an end of man as a human being, and that he blames this oblivion of progress on the pessimists. Maybe it is this

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progress that leads to an end of all history, and utopia might be heaven or hell. In the optimist’s eye, the following statement applies for the whole world:

"The unification of human civilization through modern communication and transportation means that there is no part of mankind that is not aware of the scientific method and its potential, even if that part is currently incapable of generating technology or applying it successfully. There are, in other words, no true barbarians at the gates, unaware of the power of modern natural science."\(^{46}\)

But, this kind of progress and global comparability through modern communication must not lead to homogenization because it shows us the heterogeneity of the planet, including all hopes and fears coming along with discovering the other.

Thus, Fukuyama outlines that there are global horizons of comparability and interpretation depending on progress in natural sciences, the interdependency of the world economy and military power. His characterization of a homogeneous unity leads to an internal differentiation, understood as a time-lag of some parts of the world to the standard area of modernity—the liberal democracies. In other words: In spite of the universality of historic change there is simultaneity of the un-simultaneity that results from the persistence of culturally evolved structures. Here, the parallels to Rosenstock-Huessy’s agenda are striking, since he considers local divergences from the standard area to be given when it comes to the global implementation of a revolution.\(^{47}\) At this point, Fukuyama’s approach seems assailable—not only because his prognoses have lost

plausibility a few years after the release of his book. In contrast to Rosenstock-Huessy—who pleads for a dialog between different kinds of man and cultures—Fukuyama’s consideration of a universally historical and at the same time anthropological change leads to sanctions of the divergence from the standard kind of man by the tribunal of history.

Yet, since wars are based on the impetus of man to seek recognition, the end of history cannot be peaceful as long as there are people who differ from the universal respectively Western standard. The desire to be recognized—Thmos—\(^{48}\) as being superior or equal would keep history going on.

Fukuyama’s projection of the current discourse of justice, which communicates justice as equality, onto the history of man thus loses its plausibility when an altered present makes it difficult to speak of an accomplished goal. To me, Rosenstock-Huessy’s approach is much more convincing, because he develops a dialectic or dialogic of liberation and order that is based on the change of socially constructed world(-views) legitimating a new discourse in each case and therewith institutions, which approve just actions and sanction wrong ones. *Equality* is therefore only one manifestation of *justice*.

Every form of recognition implies a criterion that is administered by institutions and determines the target course of acting. It is therefore not enough to be equal to or better than somebody else. Instead, one has to have an idea of what is understood as good. This criterion may become universally accepted, but currently it is not, since there is more than one world view in World Society—black and white and a lot of grey according to Fukuyama’s own standard. Fukuyama counters this criticism with a prognosis based on a historical parallel:

"Rather than a thousand shoots blossoming into as many different flowering plants, mankind will come to seem like a long wagon train strung along a road. Some wagons will be pulling into a sharply and crisply, while others will be bivouacked back in the desert, or else stuck in ruts in the final pass over the
mountains. Several wagons attacked by Indians, will have been set aflame and abandoned along the way. There will be a few wagoneers who, stunned by the battle, will have lost their sense of direction and are temporarily heading in the wrong direction, while one or two wagons will get tired of the journey and decide to set up permanent camps at particular points back along the road. Others will have found alternative routes to the main road, though they will discover that to get through the final mountain range they all must use the same pass. But the great majority of wagons will be making the slow journey into town, and most will arrive there. The wagons are all similar to another: while they are painted different colors and are constructed of varied materials, each has four wheels and is drawn by horses, while inside sits a family hoping and praying that their journey will be a safe one. The apparent differences in the situations of the wagons will not be seen as reflecting permanent and necessary differences between the people riding in the wagons, but simply a product of their different positions along the road.  

Thus, at the End of history all parts of the world move—little by little—into the homogeneous World State and *megalothymia* will be practiced only by mountaineering or world sports. History ends in an administered world, in which conflicts can be mediated and justice rules—at least until boredom drives man into dugouts again for the pursuit of new purposes or the tension between equality and freedom produce new conflicts.

50 Fukuyama: 2002, 328f.  
Fukuyama’s theory of a directed course of history, bound to lead to a paradise of equality, democracy and market economy, provoked much criticism after the release of the first article\textsuperscript{53} and that of the book\textsuperscript{54}. Perry Anderson offers a good review concerning the debates and very convincingly discusses Fukuyama and Niethammer, who deconstructed different Posthistorie-theories to plea for a micro-historical view. Fukuyama’s theory is provocative because the purpose of history—freedom and equality of actors, thus the annihilation of the contradictions in history—seems to contradict reality. Thereby, the purpose as the ultimate object of history becomes questionable. Anyhow, the ability to put into question is an outcome of historical progress, since it implies the recognition of a (liberal) discourse. This applies not only for Perry Anderson, who criticises Fukuyama from a leftist perspective, but also for Kees van der Pijl, who, on the basis of of Rosenstock-Huessy’s theory, postulates:

"to break out of the historic stalemate celebrated by postmodern culture [...] and of course by Fukuyama’s ›End of history‹ thesis [...] But this stalemate with its implications for global anomie and chaos [...] cannot be overcome by merely maintaining that we are still waiting or working for the socialist revolution."\textsuperscript{55}

However, afterall Pijl’s ideological caste economy is not very convincing—it seems to rest on his normative pretension rather than on an analytic distinction of both approaches. It is as well a kind of diagnosis that refers indirectly to modernization and the pressure to catch up that is put upon backward parts of

\textsuperscript{53} Fukuyama: 1989.
\textsuperscript{55} van der Pijl: 1996, 288.
the world by the modern ones. In this respect van der Pijl points to the United States and US-led global organizations as the source of this particular evil. Thus, his rejection of the positive variation of an end of history in the form of a liberal-democratic universalism is not very surprising.

"Thus we are confronted with the reality of revolutions imposing ever stricter controls of societies supposedly liberated by them. Clearly, this has to be related to a factor outside the succession of revolutions as listed by Rosenstock, i.e. the revolution of capital which itself restricts and constrains individualities and social possibilities while claiming to liberate them, and the countries trying to catch up are merely copying and selectively applying certain aspects of this regimentation to sustain their own forced marches. All the same, they continue to reproduce the postulated set of connected elements, war and revolution, nationality and universalism." 56

I guess it is too general an interpretation to see Rosenstock-Huessy as a good reference for a broad critique of globalization and universalism. As mentioned above, his approach contains critical and activating elements, like that of the pirate who, in the context of his peace service, is supposed to counteract the acceleration and the destruction of social groups. Yet, Rosenstock-Huessy does not question Modernity. Van der Pijl reminds much more to Schmitt than to Rosenstock-Huessy, because he highlights the imperial and spatial claim of universalism. At the same time, Rosenstock-Huessy postulated an End of history as a foundation of the balance of terror that necessitates cooperation and communication. Van der Pijl’s idea to fight on for socialism in contrast sounds

56 van der Pijl: 1996, 313.
more like the defiance of a defeated. However, he was not alone with his pessimism.

III. 2 Global History as cultural Space

There are, however, authors who understand heterogeneity as a threat to rather than a chance for peace—among them was Samuel P. Huntington, whose position can be seen as being opposite to Fukuyama and his theory of the End of history. Since Fukuyama’s approach acts on the assumption of a timely directionality and a purpose of history, it contradicts (or so it seems) spatially distributed differences within World Society. Huntington’s maps as well as his statistics, which he presents in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, can be contrasted with Fukuyama’s statistics about the increase of democracies. This demonstrates that both authors make prognoses based on a diagnostically selection of historical series. But Fukuyama tries to demonstrate the progress of Western institutions, whereas Huntington predicts the decline of the West (=USA) and the *Clash of Civilizations*. Both authors argue empirically and normatively, whereby Fukuyama would not distinguish between ‘normative’ and ‘theoretical’, because both attributes are just two sides of one coin: the Western discourse of progress.57

Anyway, both authors are conscious about their particular positions within the discourse of modernity—and both expound to the problem of divergence from the path of Western modernity. Yet, Fukuyama understands this divergence as a problem of establishing Western ideology after the End of history, a problem that

will diminish over time, since this process is without alternative. Instead, Huntington predicts an increasing Clash of civilizations.

"Along among civilizations the West has had a major and at times devastating impact on every other civilization. The relation between the power and culture of the West and the power and cultures of other civilizations is, as a result, the most pervasive characteristics of the world of civilizations. As the relative power of other civilizations increases, the appeal of Western culture fades and non-Western peoples have increasing confidence in and commitment to their indigenous cultures. The central problem in the relations between the West’s—particularly America’s—efforts to promote a universal Western culture and its declining ability to do so. [...] What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest." 58

Consequently, Huntington constructs a culture-based antithesis that fuels the dialectic process of thesis and antithesis and tries to unmask Fukuyama’s synthesis of liberal democracy as a utopia. Berthold C. Witte summarized the critique accurately:

"Zwar wächst die Weltgesellschaft nach dem Wegfall des Ost-West-Konflikts in der Tat immer dichter zusammen, aber gleichzeitig entwickelt sich in ihr die Antithese in der Form einer sich stets verschärfenden Konkurrenz von religiös-philosophisch grundierten Weltbildern und darauf aufbauenden kulturellen Identitätsmustern." 59

59 Witte: 2002. "In fact world society grows together more and more after the end of the East-West-conflict, but at the same time an antithesis in itself based on an intensification of rivalry between religious-philosophical grounded worldviews and that patterns of identification based on
The Western discourse in its self-conception emanates from the idea of World Society where and about which the discussion takes place. It is precisely this universalism that provokes—in the eyes of many spectators and subsequent to Huntington—an orientalist antithesis.

"Y es que lo que parece claro, para quien quiere entenderlo, es que existe una cultura de la crítica y de la competencia, del conocimiento y del intercambio, del pacto y la negociación, y una subcultura del odio y del resentimiento, del fanatismo y el autismo, de la fuerza y la violencia. La primera es característica de las sociedades occidentales liberales, cuyo número es deseable que crezca, pues su cuenta no ha llegado a su fin; la segunda es más reactiva que activa, se da tanto fuera como dentro de Occidente, pero es ante todo [...] antioccidental, caldo de cultivo del nihilismo." 60

Yet, this argument is only partially valid. As for Fukuyama, Huntington seemed to have made a successful prognosis for 9/11, but we should not limit his approach to the Islamic challenge.

Huntington has distinguished his project from other paradigms, which he accuses of more or less severe aberrations in research practice. He, for example, totally rejected the one-world-harmony paradigm that he associated with Fukuyama. To him, that paradigm has failed to acknowledge the new relevance of culture as a source of identity formation after the end of the Cold War. Other paradigms were not subject to such serious criticism but nevertheless either

rejected or incorporated into Huntington’s paradigm. It is based on the following assumptions, which are actually diagnoses or occasions:

1. “Human history is the history of civilizations.”

2. There is more than just one global civilization.

3. A civilization is a cultural entity. “Values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures” make the spatial distinction between in- and outside.

4. Even if Civilizations change, overlap, and compete with other identities they are real. Civilizations are mortal but exist for a longue durée. (Braudel) Nevertheless, they rise and fall (Spengler), merge and divide.

8. There are different civilizations existing on earth: a Sinic (China), a Japanese (Japan), a Hindu (India), an Orthodox (Russia), a Latin-American (Brasil), a Western (USA), and–possibly–a African (South Africa) one. These civilizations compete with each other.

9. Especially at the fault lines these civilization tend to clash. (a variation of Schmitt)

9. The Western Civilization is on the decline. (Spengler)

10. The Western Civilization needs to recreate its own culture and identity to stop decline.

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61 Huntington: 2003, 29-35
63 Huntington: 2003, 40.
64 Huntington: 2003, 41ff.
65 Huntington: 2003, 41.
66 Huntington: 2003, 44.
68 Huntington: 2003, 207ff, 246ff, 266ff.
69 Huntington: 2003, 30ff.
In order to support his assumption, Huntington argues by means of two kinds of media. He uses maps whose captions vary according to his requirements. This cultural mapping is disingenuous insofar as it tries to compare apples with oranges in order to illustrate the assumption of a decline of Western hegemony.\(^7^1\)

Basically, the construction of time as space seems to be answering Fukuyama’s illustration of the rise of democracy by using tables—a classical instrument to create units of meaning, as Foucault already noted.\(^7^2\) Huntington as well uses this medium—although he argued the converse—to show the decline in numbers of English speaking people or that in numbers of armed soldiers. Both cases represent a questionable use of statistics, because neither are the numbers of soldiers crucial for modern warfare nor are the numbers concerning the languages unambiguous. Both cases hint a demographic argument—a scenario of threat, fueled by economic and military examples.\(^7^3\)

In a nutshell: Huntington gives many examples to prove the decline of the West. His conception of power politics attempts to resurrect the Cold War polarity in a new cultural and, somehow, Anglo-puritan-shape. The latter is illustrated by the table containing the decline of the use of the term ‘free world’ in the key media.\(^7^4\) Now it is called: *The West against the Rest.*

\(^7^1\) Huntington: 2003, 22-27. These maps are the best examples for his mapping of the decline of the West. Nevertheless, the map of the USA demonstrating the decline of the white population is telling as well.
\(^7^2\) Foucault: 2006, 23.
\(^7^3\) Huntington: 2003, 60, 61, 84, 85, 86, 88 (just some examples).
\(^7^4\) Huntington: 2003, 55.
Thereby, Huntington develops an opposition shaped as friend-enemy and internal-external, which is not less radical than that of Schmitt, who laments the loss of Eurocentrism in international law after 1945 but who at least had the idea of lines of friendship instead of fault-lines.\textsuperscript{75} Huntington’s models are designed spatially–even he uses statistics to map the world–and aim at the draft of fault lines between different civilizations. It is out of this Bellicism from which Huntington draws the picture of ongoing Western politics–for example the supply of weapons, the migration controls etc. Yet, to him it is much more important to reconstruct a lost Western identity–a project he pursued in most of his other writings as well. This identity is not shaped by Genové’s pairs of opposition but embodies a distortion of the American spirit: You have to speak

\textsuperscript{75} Schmitt: 1997, 293ff, 299.
English, be a Protestant, and you should have many soldiers—that is what his figures tell. This sounds like struggling for predestination with the colt and carrying *white man’s burden* even at home. This explains, for example, his ranking of Spain among the West, while Latin America—not less Catholic and sharing the same language—is said to form a distinct civilization and therefore a potential threat.\textsuperscript{76}

His work was generally read in the cloud of the fallen Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Therefore, the criticism of his civilizing internal-external and friend-enemy dichotomy is owed to the diagnosis, as is the approval and advancement of his work. Anyhow, Huntington argues by drawing historical parallels to make his prognosis, and in doing so he refers to a number of different experts of universal history—among them Braudel, Toynbee and Spengler. Yet, the extreme and historical sharpening of the argument follows from the use of conceptions developed by Schmitt. This applies in particular to the internal-external and friend-enemy opposition and to the fault lines. He nevertheless never mentions Schmitt—that probably would have been inappropriate, since Schmitt’s criteria of politics (friend-enemy) are presented by Schmitt as one extreme in the state of emergency. Braudel as well is marked down to his outline of the Clash of Civilization, though he covers cooperation as well.\textsuperscript{77} For Spengler applies that his assumption of the downfall of the occident was out-dated even in

\textsuperscript{76} Huntington: 2003, 26f.

\textsuperscript{77} Huntington: 2003, 39, 55.
Spengler’s time, as was noted by Rosenstock-Huessy as early as 1931: The holistic Occident had already made way for a heterogeneous Europe.²⁸

Are, after all, the fragmentation and the unity of the world possible at the same time? Rosenstock-Huessy understands the polyphony of voices as part of World Society in the sense of mutual recognition. At the same time, the ideological as well as the cultural formation of camps imply the unity of the world, because both are an outcome of the Western homogenization discourse, which allows for criticism as well as self-reflection. This discourse, however, requires the communicative availability and therefore the capability of world-societal self-observation and self-criticism that can derive only from trajective historical self-characterization in terms of Rosenstock-Huessy’s Autobiography of mankind. Hence, the normative demand—as a form of discourse—always refers to the unity of world history and World Society. After all, Fukuyama and Huntington are both part of one discourse of self-characterization, because the description of internal differentiation implies the construction of a global unity. But they deal with this diagnosis in different ways: whereas Fukuyama uses a serial history of anthropological and material progress to predict a World State, it is Huntington who constructs a serial history of the decline of the West to forecast a Clash of Civilizations based on spatial identities.

VI. Pirates in the Sea of History—Drawing a Historical Parallel

"A world ends when its metaphor has died."

²⁸ Rosenstock-Huessy: 1951, 34-56.
It is meant in a programmatic way when Harold Berman—one of Rosenstock-Huessy's most famous students—starts his great history of law by quoting „the metaphor“ by Archibald MacLeish. In his opinion an age was coming to its end in the 20th century that was characterized by a structure of cross references of linguistic metaphors in the field of law and religion in the Western world. He was afraid that both languages had lost their ability to provide society with a vision for future and past and that both would forfeit their ability to provoke passion and addiction.

As a solution to this crisis Berman pleads for a mutual opening of both fields in order to develop new options for the future. It appears that the crisis of society contains a crisis of representation of the society's history and that there is a need for a multidisciplinary effort in science. A universal, trans-, inter-, or multidisciplinary science dedicated to the multiformity of man and metanomics of society was at the heart of the program of Rosenstock-Huessy's sociology as well.

It is not surprising that historians in an age of crisis rethink their paradigms, nevertheless it is striking that space and time categories play a key role in the visions of a renewed interdisciplinary science. This is, for example, the case in the theories of Fernand Braudel, Francis Fukuyama, Immanuel Wallerstein and—last but not least—Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. These scholars have in common that they started to rethink and rewrite history and that some of them shared a distance to positivism and historicism even if their definitions of these puppets may differ.
In the case of Schmitt and Rosenstock-Huessy—for example—this kind of criticism started with a reflection on political theology and on what historians of the last century called secularization, modernization, or just a *Clash of civilizations* or cultures based on the changes in discourse, belief, and gravity. Additionally, the signature of speech—no matter whether you call it discourse, code, or program—is the representation of transcendent norms to empower immanent institutions. Therefore, a dialogue between different societies in space and time includes a reflection and discussion of values and norms. This interpretation of a plural World Society differs from the *hubris* of a World State based on a rational discourse represented by statistics, linear timelines, and assimilation pressure.

Berman has advanced Rosenstock-Huessy’s ideas concerning the global implementation of Western institutions, because Rosenstock-Huessy had understood the overall process of history as a reversal of the proportion of particulate and universalistic thinking. While in the 11th century the Church stood for the unity of the world and the economy for its division, that interconnection was reversed in the 20th century, according to Rosenstock-Huessy: "Church and economy have changed their places during the last thousand years."82

In Fukuyama’s theory, the End of history appears—despite the marketization of most areas of life—foremost as the implementation of a liberal, individualistic and democratic discourse. According to Fukuyama, who follows the argumentation of Kojève and Hegel, the language of democracy has prevailed

82 Rosenstock-Huessy: Out of Revolution, 496.
because it had the ability to bring to an end the impetus of world history—the conflict between master and servant—by the means of establishing equality: The *Thymos* (θυμός) as the driving force of a man-made history is pacified politically and turns to the satisfaction of private desires like climbing the Mount Everest or surfing at Waimea Bay. In other words: The *End of history* does not mean the establishment of a new sense but the interlinking of the plurality of this sense with the democratic potential for self-fulfillment instead of collective responsibility and passion. Man becomes a subjective and speechless island within the great sea of total immanency. To sail for the shores of this sea and interlink them is—according to Rosenstock-Huessy—the job of the *pirate* who recreates peace by his overcoming of space as a playground for indifference of fundamentalism.

Fukuyama and Rosenstock-Huessy’s diagnoses are not so far away from each other to some extent, because the latter’s approach follows the tradition of the teachings of diffusion and challenge of institutions as well. But, in contrast to Fukuyama’s postmodern universe, Rosenstock-Huessy’s assumption of a World Society is based on the division of labor and global communication. He constructs World Society as a result of European history, not as a uni— but as a pluriversum whose peaceful unity depends on a (rather non-centric dialogue between different cultures.

Huntington, on the other hand, understands this *pluriversum* as a threat to Western civilization. In his eyes, globalization is a process of disintegration of Western identity and of strengthening alternative identities encompassing from
the West. Despite his historical approach, his perspective is not only one-sided but contradictory. He, for instance, constructs the difference between civilizations based on a definition of culture, which he tries to ground historically without considering that it is an imagined community with new characteristics. Where could we find those civilizations during the Cold War? Were they insignificant for identity formation, although they seem to be that almighty and although they have evolved over a long period of time? Additionally, Huntington interprets the flow of cultural institutions in a completely one-sided way. Precisely this flow could uncover or reproduce cultural differentiation—a fact that already Rosenstock-Huessy understood.

Nevertheless, the present global context of comparison is a *Eurocentric* one because it is marked by the dominant language of justice based on the institution of *equality* that was empowered in the *French Revolution*.83 It applies for the present but even more for the past that divergences are detected on the basis of differences regarding the access to economic prospects and measured by means of statistical data. Afterall, the language of democracy cannot be separated from the language of economics; a fact that Rosenstock-Huessy but especially Fukuyama—despite all weaknesses of his *posthistorie*-thinking—understood in principle and—despite of all fear of a meaningless modernity—no one in his/her clear mind would put into question that democracy is the best alternative of all regimes of equality.

Currently we are living in an age of revolutions again. The democratic change in the Arabian world—the so called facebook-revolutions—do not just

83) This is a point I completely share with Fukuyama and J. Meyer.
change the political institutions in states like Tunisia or Egypt but it challenges Western prejudices about undemocratic, tribal and hierarchical structures of Islamic societies too. What we are witnessing is law-making in the streets (Fischer-Lescano)\textsuperscript{84} of Cairo and Tunes but also the struggle for deciding about the state of emergency in Lybia. I would like to argue that global communication (for ex. through global social networks like facebook) has established another global communicative space based on several horizons of comparability such as economy, culture, and justice. These horizons of comparability have opened the windows for the publicity of scandals based on global institutions like equal freedom of speech or human rights.\textsuperscript{85} Having the ability to globally compare their situation, people have got the chance to judge on their situation locally. Thus, the acceptance and the struggle against global or Western institutions like equal rights, freedom of speech, or democracy is a classical element of revolution and rewriting of history at least since the French Revolution. In the case of the facebook-revolutions we will see whether a rewriting of history will happen. This implies that there must new expectations and a new future–a new \textit{Nomos of earth} must be raised from \textit{below}.

In the state of emergency man does search for historical orientation and perspective. These days, society lacks institutions–values and norms–because the old "rules of the game" (North) have failed to provide orientation and to reduce contingency. Therefore, the time of crisis is the time for diagnosis and prophecy, and historians play a key role by drawing historical parallels for establishing and

\textsuperscript{84} Fischer-Lescano: 2005. \\
legitimating a new world view as an old, traditional or grown one. Whereas Fukuyama’s diagnosis glanced in the light of the end of Cold War and prognosticated *utopia* based on a serial history, it was Huntington who forecasted and mapped the decline of the West in the coming shadow of *Ground Zero*. History seems to be relative to history.

Thus, historians are involved observers. They have to carefully reflect on the political constructions of space and time, because these are the tools and concepts for differentiating between civilizations as friends and enemies or alternatively as associations and dissociations. In doing so, they have the responsibility to reflect on the historical parallels, diagnosis, and prognosis they draft for providing orientation. The new *Nomos of earth* is based on global communication and it is not bound to space. Maybe a term like *facebook-revolution* fits quite well to the horizons of comparability which annihilate local space and create a glocality—a World Society—marked by local processes of the implementation and decoupling of global institutions—norms and values. Anyway, even a term like glocality does not mean that there are no counter-concepts (indicating synchronically- and diachronically social-political divergence) anymore, but it means that hybrid concepts are just an indicator for dialogue inside one world but not for the end of politics as an End of history.

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy called for a work service and asked for *pirates* who are tough enough to speak and act if politics become scandalous. In our days, the *moral equivalent of war* (William James) means neither peace at any cost nor war for free—it means keeping a critical and open mind to observe both.
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